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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 





Polar Semiconductor, Inc., 
a Minnesota corporation,
Defendant.
Lance R. Heisler, Esq. and Lampe Law Group, LLP, 105 East 
Fifth Street, Northfield, MN 55057, counsel for 
plaintiff.
David A. Davenport, Esq., Derek R. Allen, Esq. and 
Winthrop & Weinstine, PA, 225 South Sixth Street, Suite 
3500, Minneapolis, MN 55401, counsel for defendant.
This matter is before the court upon the motion for summary 
judgment by defendant Polar Semiconductor, Inc. (Polar). Based 
upon a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and for 
the following reasons, the motion is granted in part.
This employment dispute arises out of the termination of 
plaintiff David Gregor by Polar. Gregor began working at Polar as 
a maintenance technician in March 2003. Gregor Dep. 25:20-26:3. 
Gregor's primary job duties included the repair and preventative 
maintenance of machinery used to manufacture semiconductors. 
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used tools "that require[d] turning, twisting and manipulating." 
Id. Gregor also performed duties outside of his official job 
description, including procuring equipment, evaluating assemblies 
and parts for equipment, auditing inventory and writing maintenance 
specifications. Id. 5 4.
On December 24, 2009, Gregor suffered a non-work related 
injury, resulting in the partial loss of the index and middle 
fingers on his dominant right hand. Gregor Dep. 41:11-43:5. The 
injury required multiple surgeries and prevented Gregor from 
working. Id. at 43:6-22; 52:17-53:5. In response, Polar placed 
Gregor on short-term disability leave. Roberts Dep. 55:2-5.
Polar typically provides Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 
leave for up to twelve weeks, but extended Gregor's leave when he 
was unable to return to work in March 2010. Gregor Dep. 53:24­
54:19. On June 4, 2010, Gregor submitted a report of workability 
indicating that he would be unable to work until at least July 1, 
2010. Gregor Aff. Ex. 3. Thereafter, on June 30, 2010, Deborah 
Roberts, a Polar human resources manager, informed Gregor that he 
had been administratively terminated effective June 24, 2010. 
Gregor Aff. 5 10. During that conversation, Gregor requested to 
return to work at Polar in a position other than maintenance 
technician, and Roberts explained that "we don't really do that, we 
have long term disability." Id. 5 12. Roberts explained that the 
decision was in accordance with Polar protocol, whereby employees
2
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are terminated after their short-term disability concludes. Id. 
5 13.
On July 9, 2010, Gregor was cleared to return to work, but was 
instructed to avoid "pinch[ing] and fine manipulation" and 
"vibrating tools." Id. Ex. 4. Moreover, Gregor was advised not to 
perform torquing, crimping or any firm grasping with his right 
hand. Id. To date, Gregor still does not have the ability to 
pinch between his thumb and index or middle fingers. Gregor Dep. 
57:4-7.
In a letter dated July 22, 2010, Gregor acknowledged that he 
was "physically unable" to return to his former position, but 
requested an "accommodation from Polar ... [and] to return to work 
in the position of Equipment Manager, or similar position for which 
[he was] qualified." Gregor Ex. 5. Roberts responded on July 27, 
2010, explaining that Gregor did not qualify for any open 
managerial positions. Id. Ex. 6. Roberts encouraged Gregor to 
check a publicly-accessible website for posted positions. Id. 
Gregor never applied for an open position at Polar. Id. 5 17.
On November 9, 2011, Gregor filed suit, alleging violations of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and FMLA1 and wrongful 
termination. Polar moves for summary judgment.
1 At oral argument, Gregor abandoned his FMLA claim.
3
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DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of 
the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could 
cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. See 
id. at 252.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court views all evidence 
and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
See id. at 255. The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon 
mere denials or allegations in the pleadings but must set forth 
specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. See 
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A party asserting that a genuine dispute 
exists — or cannot exist — about a material fact must cite 
"particular parts of materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(1)(A). If a plaintiff cannot support each essential element 
of a claim, the court must grant summary judgment because a 
complete failure of proof regarding an essential element 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. 
at 322-23.
4
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II. ADA
The ADA prohibits discrimination by an employer "against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(a). "To obtain relief under the ADA, [a plaintiff] must 
show that he (1) has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, 
(2) is a qualified individual under the ADA, and (3) suffered an 
adverse employment action as a result of the disability."2 Fenney 
v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
When, as here, plaintiff raises a failure-to-accommodate claim 
and presents no evidence of direct discrimination, the court 
applies a modified burden-shifting analysis. Id. at 712. "Under 
the modified burden-shifting approach, the employee must first make 
a facial showing that he has an ADA disability and that he has 
suffered [an] adverse employment action. Then he must make a 
facial showing that he is a qualified individual." Brannon v. Luco 
Mop Co., 521 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). "The employee 
at all times retains the burden of persuading the trier of fact 
that he has been the victim of illegal discrimination due to his 
disability." Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
2 The parties do not dispute that the termination of Gregor on 
June 24, 2010, constitutes an adverse employment action under the 
ADA.
5
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A. Disability
The ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). "[M]ajor life activities include, but are 
not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, 
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, 
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, 
thinking, communicating, and working." Id. § 12102(2)(A). Polar 
argues that Gregor is not disabled. In response, Gregor states 
that he is disabled in the major life activities of performing 
manual tasks and working.3
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) became effective on 
January 1, 2009. See Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3559.4 
Under the ADAAA, "[t]he definition of disability ... shall be 
construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals ..., to the 
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(4)(A) (citation omitted). Without defining "substantially 
limits," the ADAAA states that the term shall be interpreted 
consistently with the findings and purposes of the [Act]. Id.
3 Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, 
the court finds that a material fact dispute exists as to whether 
Gregor is disabled in the major life activity of performing manual 
tasks. As a result, the court need not determine whether Gregor is 
disabled in the major life activity of working.
4 Gregor was terminated on July 24, 2010, and the court
applies the ADAAA.
6
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§ 12102(4)(B). In turn, the ADAAA specifically
reject[s] the standards enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 
(2002) ..., [whereby] to be substantially
limited in performing a major life activity 
under the ADA an individual must have an 
impairment that prevents or severely restricts 
the individual from doing activities that are 
of central importance to most people's daily 
lives.
ADAAA, § 2(b)(4) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the present action, Gregor presents evidence that he is 
unable to pinch between his thumb and index or middle fingers. 
Gregor Dep. 57:4-9. Moreover, Gregor has diminished grip strength, 
an inability to make torquing or crimping movements and a 
restriction against using vibrating tools or carrying heavy 
objects. Id. at 77:7-78:10. Construing this evidence in a light 
most favorable to Gregor, the court concludes that a reasonable 
juror could find that Gregor is substantially limited in the major 
life activity of performing manual tasks.
Such a conclusion is buttressed by the regulations promulgated 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 2011.5 In
5 Gregor was terminated prior to enactment of the amended EEOC 
regulations, which took effect on May 24, 2011. See Allen v.
SouthCrest Hosp., 455 F. App'x 827, 835 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(unpublished). In Allen, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "[t]he 
ADAAA did not ... explicitly discuss or modify the definition of 
the major life activity of working," and applied the 2010 
regulations, rather than retroactively apply the amended EEOC 
regulations. Id. at 834. In the present matter, the 2010 EEOC 
regulations did not provide interpretive guidance regarding the
(continued...)
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the ADAAA, Congress directed the EEOC "to issue regulations
implementing the definitions of disability in section 12102." 42
U.S.C. § 12205a. These regulations explain that "substantially
limits" is not meant to be a demanding standard. 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(j)(1)(i). An impairment is a disability when "it
substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a
major life activity as compared to most people in the general
population,... [and the] impairment need not prevent, or
significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing
a major life activity in order to be considered substantially
limiting." Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The EEOC explains
that the major life activity of performing 
manual tasks (which was at issue in Toyota) 
could have many different manifestations, such 
as performing tasks involving fine motor 
coordination, or performing tasks involving 
grasping, hand strength, or pressure. Such 
tasks need not constitute activities of 
central importance to most people's daily 
lives, nor must an individual show that he or 
she is substantially limited in performing all 
manual tasks.
Id. Pt. 1630, app. (emphasis added). These regulations, 
promulgated pursuant to the ADAAA, reinforce the court's conclusion 5
5(...continued)
major life activity of performing manual tasks. As a result, Allen 
is distinguishable, and the court finds that the amended EEOC 
regulations are persuasive indicia of Congress's intent when 
promulgating the ADAAA.
8
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that a fact issue exists as to whether Gregor is disabled for 
purposes of the ADA. Therefore, the court examines whether Gregor 
is a qualified individual under the ADA.
B. Qualified Individual
"To be a qualified individual under the ADA, an employee must 
(1) possess the requisite skill, education, experience, and 
training for [his] position; and (2) be able to perform the 
essential job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation." 
Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corporate Servs., Inc., 691 F.3d 925, 930 
(8th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Neither party disputes that Gregor possessed the requisite skill 
and experience necessary for the maintenance technician position. 
See Gregor Aff. Ex. 2. As already explained, however, Gregor's 
limitations preclude him from performing the essential functions of 
the job without an accommodation. Gregor Dep. 77:7-78:10. As a 
result, the court examines whether a reasonable accommodation 
existed.
"In cases where the employee claims that he is able to perform 
the essential functions of the job with a reasonable accommodation, 
the employee must only make a facial showing that a reasonable 
accommodation is possible." Brannon v. Luco Mop Co., 521 F.3d 843, 
848 (8th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Reasonable accommodations include "job restructuring, 
part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
9
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position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, 
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training 
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or 
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with 
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). If an employee satisfies 
the facial showing, the burden "shifts to the employer to show that 
it is unable to accommodate the employee." Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. 
& E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a reasonable 
accommodation exists is often a fact question to be decided by the 
jury. See EEOC v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 491 F.3d 
790, 796 (8th Cir. 2007).
An employer must "mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the 
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability who is an ... employee, unless [the 
employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of the business of [the employer]." 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). "To determine the appropriate 
reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to 
initiate an informal, interactive process with the [employee] with 
a disability in need of the accommodation.6 This process should
6 It is unclear whether Gregor requested a formal 
accommodation prior to termination. Polar does not argue that 
Gregor failed to do so, and Roberts states that she "spoke with 
Gregor about ... [Polar's] ability to accommodate [his] defined
(continued...)
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identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and 
potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those 
limitations." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). "[T]he failure of an 
employer to engage in an interactive process to determine whether 
reasonable accommodations are possible is prima facie evidence that 
the employer may be acting in bad faith." Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut 
of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 1999). Polar argues that 
it satisfied its obligations by (1) extending short-term disability 
leave and (2) attempting to reassign Gregor to an open position.
Polar first argues that it accommodated Gregor by extending 
his short-term disability leave beyond the twelve weeks required by 
the FMLA. "[A]llowing a medical leave of absence might, in some 
circumstances, be a reasonable accommodation." Brannon, 521 F.3d 
at 849 (citation omitted). Here, however, Polar retroactively 
terminated Gregor once his short-term disability benefits lapsed. 
See Heisler Decl. Ex. B, at 2 (explaining Polar policy that results 
in "termination of employment" when employee is unable to return to 
work after short-term disability lapses). Moreover, Gregor's 
termination predates discussions with Polar regarding accommodation 
or reassignment.6 7 See Gregor Aff. 55 10-11; Id. Ex. 3 (report of
6(...continued)
physical limitations" on or near June 30, 2010. Heisler Decl. Ex 
B, at 1.
7 This is particularly troubling considering that on June 24, 
2010, Polar allegedly "received a work ability form from [Gregor's]
(continued...)
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workability). As a result, a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Polar failed to engage in the interactive process and did not offer 
Gregor a reasonable accommodation.
Polar next argues that it engaged in the interactive process 
by attempting to reassign Gregor to a vacant position. 
"[R]eassignment to a vacant position" is a possible accommodation 
under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). Polar, however, did not 
engage in any discussion regarding reassignment until after it 
terminated Gregor. See Heisler Decl. Ex. B; Gregor Aff. Exs. 5-6. 
As a result, the court cannot conclude that Polar engaged in the 
interactive process by attempting to reassign Gregor to a vacant 
position.7 8
Of course, "an employer will not be held liable under the ADA 
for failing to engage in an interactive process if no reasonable 
accommodation was possible." See Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952. 
Here, Polar argues that "[h]ad there been an opening that [Gregor] 
had an interest in and he was qualified for, we would have pursued 
an interactive discussion with him. We would have automatically
7(...continued)
doctor stating that he could return to work but that he could not 
do any pinching with his right hand for 6-8 weeks." See Heisler 
Decl. Ex. B, at 3. The court notes, however, that the June 24, 
2010, doctor's report is not in the record.
8 This is especially true considering that upon termination, 
Gregor lost access to Polar's intranet, where the company posts 
positions that are available exclusively to current Polar 
employees. Gregor Aff. 5 17.
12
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given it to him." Roberts Dep. 95:23-96:2. Gregor notes, however, 
that when he was terminated, two positions - Process Engineering 
Manager and Chemical Sustaining Operator - were open. See Roberts 
Dep. 86:4-23; see also Heisler Decl. Ex B, at 2 (email outlining 
three available positions: Chemical Sustaining Operations, Process 
Engineering Manager, Split Shift C/D). It is unclear whether 
Gregor was qualified for the position as a Process Engineering 
Manager. See Gregor Aff. Ex. 6 (explaining that position requires 
bachelor degree in electrical engineering and "two years' 
experience working for Japanese auto firms"). Gregor claims, 
however, that he was qualified and could perform the essential 
functions of the chemical sustaining position with "little or no 
accommodation." Id. 5 24. Polar, meanwhile, presents no evidence 
to the contrary.9 See Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. 
City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[S]worn statements that 
she met position requirements, her submission of relevant job 
postings, as well as her apparently competent performance ... 
create[d] a fact question as to whether she was qualified for any 
of the identified positions ... and whether reassigning her to one 
of these positions would be a reasonable accommodation." (citations
9 Instead, Polar argues that Gregor was uninterested in the 
position. Roberts Dep. 47:9. Gregor, however, need only show that 
an accommodation was possible. Brannon, 521 F.3d at 848. 
Moreover, Polar did not learn of Gregor's alleged disinterest until 
after the effective date of his termination. See Roberts Dep. 
46:15-20 (noting conversation with Gregor occurred on approximately 
June 25, 2010).
13
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omitted)). As a result, viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to Gregor, the court cannot conclude that reassignment 
was impossible. Therefore, a material fact dispute exists as to 
whether Gregor is a qualified individual under the ADA, and summary 
judgment is not warranted.
III. Wrongful Termination
Gregor bases his wrongful termination claim on a violation of 
the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). See Compl. 55 6-7. "Apart 
from one difference, which is not relevant here, an MHRA claim 
proceeds the same way as does a claim under the ADA." Rask v. 
Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., 509 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(citation omitted). Therefore, summary judgment as to the MHRA 
claim is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
defendant's motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 9] is granted in 
part, consistent with this order:
1. The motion is denied as to plaintiff's claims for 
violation of the ADA and wrongful termination; and
14
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2. The motion is granted as to plaintiff's 
violation of the FMLA.
Dated: February 13, 2013
s/David S. Doty_____
David S. Doty, Judge 
United States Distri
claim for
ct Court
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